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I. Introduction
Corporate social and environmental disclosure (CSE
disclosure) in a simple sense means that a company communicates
information concerning its social and environmental performance
to external audiences.' A company may voluntarily disclose social
or environmental information to the public, but at present quite a
large amount of information is involuntarily disclosed due to legal
tPaul F. Lazarsfeld Fellow, Department of Sociology, Columbia University; JSD (2008),
LLM (2005), University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. This article is an extension of
my JSD dissertation. I am grateful to Professors Cynthia Williams, Ruth Aguilera, Tom
Ginsburg and Tom Ulen. Errors remain my own.
I See generally MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE (2002) (exploring
corporate transparency as a policy innovation).
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requirements.2 There are a variety of CSE disclosure schemes in
different areas of law. The traditional legal forums for CSE
disclosure are in such areas as labor, occupational safety, product
safety, environmental protection, and consumer protection law. In
the United States, for example, under occupational safety law,
employers are required to disclose information about hazardous
chemicals at the workplace to workers;3 under environmental law,
manufacturers are required to disclose toxic releases to the public;4
and under food safety law, food processors are required to disclose
nutritional information about their products to customers.5 The
disclosure schemes are based on the philosophy that information
disclosure can minimize related risks through strengthening
market and political pressures on companies. 6 Intuitively, for
example, occupational safety laws deal with occupational safety
information, environmental laws deal with environmental
information, and food safety laws deal with food safety
information. In addition to these traditional areas, securities law
has recently emerged as a new CSE disclosure forum.7 The CSE
disclosure in securities markets and its relevant legal questions are
the focus of this Article.
Information disclosure is an important pillar of securities
markets. Traditionally, disclosure in securities markets concerns
only fmancial information. Companies disclose four basic
financial statements (balance sheets, income statements, cash flow
statements, and the statement of changes in shareholder's equity)
and other relevant fmancial information to investors. Investors use
the financial information to calculate investment risks and make
investment decisions. The importance of financial information to
investors is self-evident and well-accepted. Financial disclosure is
the orthodox focus of securities law. But how can CSE disclosure
enter into securities markets and even step into the core territory of
securities law?
2 Id. at 2.
3 Id. at 9,
4 Id. at 8.
5Id.
6 Id. at 2.
7 See generally Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities Exchange Commission and
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1197 (1999) (analyzing CSE
disclosure in the U.S. securities regulations).
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In a conventional sense, CSE information may be deemed
irrelevant to securities investment. But as this Article will explain,
the emergence of socially responsible investing (SRI) poses a
great challenge to the seeming irrelevancy of CSE information.
Companies are expected to provide not only the quantity of goods,
services and employment, but also the quality of life for those
whose interests are affected by corporate activities (e.g.,
employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, and local
communities). Whether and how a company lives up to these
public expectations can significantly affect its financial returns,
which makes CSE disclosure material to investors.
The richest information source for investors of CSE
information to calculate investment risks is companies themselves.
Thus, a growing number of companies, particularly in developed
markets, have disclosed social and environmental information
along with financial information to investors. Based on the
current practices in securities markets, corporate social
information generally covers issues concerning labor rights
(freedom of association; working conditions; equal opportunities;
health and safety); human rights; community relations; consumer
protection; philanthropy; or political contributions. Corporate
environmental information may include issues concerning
environmental law compliance; climate change and related risks;
environmental management systems; or waste treatment and
recycling. Specific issues may vary among sectors. More
recently, many developed markets such as France, 8 Denmark,9
Norway, 10 and the United Kingdom " have introduced CSE
8 See generally Lucien J. Dhooge, Beyond Voluntarism: Social Disclosure and
France's Nouvelles Regulations Economiques, 21 ARiz. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 441 (2004)
(discussing CSE disclosure in France).
9 See The Danish Commerce and Companies Agency on Corporate Social
Responsibility, Statutory Requirements on Reporting CSR,
http://www.csrgov.dk/sw5ll90.asp (on Dec. 16, 2008, the Danish Parliament passed a
bill making CSE disclosure mandatory in the financial annual report for the largest 1,100
Danish companies) (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
10 See generally Audun Ruud et al., Corporate Responsibility Reporting in Norway:
An Assessment of the 100 Largest Firms (ProSus 2005), available at
httpJ/www.prosus.uio.no/publikasjoner/Rapporter/2005-9/rapp9.pdf.
I I See generally Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?
The Erosion of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 493 (2005) (discussing the legislative development in the United Kingdom); Cynthia
2009]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
disclosure requirements to corporate or securities law.
Most of the existing legal literature on CSE disclosure focuses
on developed markets. 2 Little attention has been paid to emerging
securities markets. The purpose of this Article is to fill the void.
CSE disclosure can play an important role in promoting economic
prosperity, environmental sustainability and social stability, which
all are interlinked with market health. This disclosure may
increase public monitoring over companies' compliance with
social and environmental regulations and even press companies to
go beyond compliance with the regulations. 13 CSE disclosure
therefore would make more contributions for emerging markets
where law is unable to provide social and environmental
protection than for developed markets where law is relatively
capable of providing such protection. CSE disclosure also links
with the idea of SRI, which may directly channel money toward
sustainable projects.
This Article will first explain why CSE information is
meaningful for investors in securities markets. It then will show
that SRI is growing in some major emerging markets such as
South Korea and China, and that further growth of SRI is
conditioned upon a sufficient supply of CSE information. This
Article will also examine current CSE disclosure practices in
emerging securities markets. CSE disclosure is growing in
emerging markets but still faces various problems. In order to
correct the problems and promote CSE disclosure, some emerging
A. Williams & John M. Conley, Triumph or Tragedy? The Curious Path of Corporate
Disclosure Reform in the U.K., 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 317 (2007).
12 See, e.g., Mitchell F. Crusto, Endangered Green Reports: "Cumulative
Materiality" in Corporate Environmental Disclosure after Sarbanes-Oxley, 42 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 483 (2005); Lucien J. Dhooge, supra note 8 (discussing CSE disclosure in
France); Robert H. Feller, Environmental Disclosure and the Securities Law, 22 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 225 (1995); David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial
Corporate Performance: The Material Edges of Social and Environmental Disclosure,
11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151 (2004); Benjamin J. Richardson, Enlisting Institutional
Investors in Environmental Regulation: Some Comparative and Theoretical
Perspectives, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 247 (2002); Allison M. Snyder, Holding
Multinational Corporations Accountable: Is Non-Financial Disclosure the Answer?,
2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 565 (2007); Williams, supra note 7; Williams & Conley,
supra note 11 (discussing CSE disclosure in UK); Valerie Ann Zondorak, A New Face in
Corporate Environmental Responsibility: The Valdez Principles, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 457 (1991).
13 Graham, supra note 1, at 4, 11.
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markets have very recently set up disclosure requirements in
securities regulations or stock exchanges' listing rules. Thus, this
Article will examine the regulatory development in emerging
markets, including South Africa, Malaysia, China, Taiwan, and
Thailand. It will then compare the regulatory patterns in these
markets. Finally, this Article will discuss the challenges that
different regulatory approaches pose to emerging markets and give
recommendations.
To clarify, the scope of emerging securities markets concerned
in this Article generally adopts the classification provided by
FTSE, a world leader in creating and managing indexes for
securities markets, and by MSCI Barra Inc., a leading company in
providing investment decision tools for investment institutions.
14
The scope of emerging markets provided here, therefore, excludes
very immature securities markets in the least developed and some
developing countries. Emerging securities markets generally refer
to countries such as Brazil, China, India, Russia, South Africa,
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan, and South Korea.
II. Socially Responsible Investing and CSE Disclosure
Companies do not bother to disclose CSE information to
investors if there is no market demand. Investors' demand is a
major driving force for the growth of CSE disclosure in securities
markets.
Many empirical studies show that corporate social and
environmental performance is positively associated with corporate
financial performance, particularly through the medium of
reputation. "5 Corporations with good social and environmental
performance reputations can improve relationships with creditors
and suppliers, thus attracting better employees and more
consumers. The positive relationship between
14 See MSCI Barra Emerging Market Indices,
http://www.mscibarra.com/products/indices/licd/em.html (containing the emerging
market list of MSCI); FTSE Emerging Markets, http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE_
EmergingMarkets/index.jsp (containing the emerging market list of FTSE) (last visited
Oct. 25, 2009).
15 See Marc Orlitzky et al., Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-
Analysis, 24 ORG. STUD. 403 (2003) (detailing a debate about social/environmental
performance and financial performance for decades, but confirming the positive
relationship in a recent and important study with more rigorous methodology).
20091
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social/environmental performance and financial performance
strongly suggests that investment analysis should include social
and environmental factors. This investment approach is embodied
in SRI, the key strategies of which include screening, integration,
and engagement. Screening is intended to control investment risks
by avoiding investment in certain companies completely.
Integration is intended to adjust risks by weighing social and
environmental factors and giving preference to companies with
better performance. Engagement is intended to control risks by
actively changing corporate behavior through dialogue with
companies, submissions of shareholder proposals to companies,
and exercising shareholder voting rights. These SRI strategies rely
heavily on the availability of credible CSE information. Without
CSE information, investors do not know which companies should
be screened out, which ones should be given preference, and how
to exercise their voting power to press companies to change
behavior.
According to statistics provided by SRI communities, over the
past decade, developed markets experienced strong SRI growth.
For example, in the United States, the SRI assets grew from $639
billion in 1995 to $2.71 trillion in 2007, accounting for ten percent
of all assets under professional management in the securities
market. 16 In Europe, SRI assets significantly increased from €336
billion in 2002 to C2.665 trillion in 2007.17 SRI has evolved from
eccentric practices by a small club of faith-based investors to
innovative strategies by a large community of financially-
sophisticated investors. 18 Major asset management companies
offer a variety of SRI products. Large institutional investors,
particularly pension funds that focus on long-term growth (e.g.
16 See SOCIAL INVESTMENT FORUM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF 2007 REPORT ON
SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTING TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2007), available at
http://www.socialinvest.org/pdf/SRITrendsExecSummary_2007.pdf.
17 European Sustainable and Responsible Investment Forum, European SRI Study
2008 (2008), available at http://www.eurosif.org/media/files/
eurosif_sristudy_2008_global_01.
18 See Steve Schueth, Socially Responsible Investing in the United States, 43 J.
Bus. ETMCS 189, 189 (2003) (giving a brief history of SRI's religious origins; explaining
that "[i]n early biblical times, Jewish law laid down many directives about how to invest
ethically" and that the Quakers and Methodists have avoided profits at the expense of the
killing and the enslavement of human begins; also arguing that the avoidance of
investment in sin stocks originated from the religious beliefs).
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CalPERS, the largest public pension fund in the United States),
have adopted responsible investment principles. Leading financial
information services have launched a number of SRI indices,
including the Dow Jones Sustainability Index and FTSE4Good
Index Series. Global financial institutions have endorsed SRI
commitment initiatives, among which the United Nations
Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI) is a leading
example. 19 Under the UN PRI, signatory financial institutions
commit themselves to integrating environmental, social and
corporate governance issues into investment analysis and decision-
making processes. Currently 459 financial institutions are
signatories under the UN PRI, and most of them operate in
developed markets.2"
Investors in emerging markets, however, present relatively
weak demand for SRI. The International Finance Corporation
(IFC), the private sector arm of the World Bank Group, tentatively
estimated in 2003 that only 0.1% ($2.7 billion) of the SRI assets
globally were located in emerging markets.21 Yet, SRI has rapidly
grown in emerging markets since that time. According to the
latest IFC report on emerging markets, SRI in emerging markets
reached a record high of $145 billion in 2007, although a sharp
decline followed in 2008 due to the global financial crisis.22 With
a different methodology, another survey recently conducted by the
IFC and the global consulting firm Mercer estimates that the size
of SRI assets in emerging markets is now over $300 billion. 23 The
survey also finds that forty-six percent of the 177 asset managers
with investment in emerging markets have a policy regarding the
integration of social and environmental factors into their
19 See UN PRI, http://www.unpri.org (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
20 UN PRI, PRI REPORT ON PROGRESS 2009 (2009), available at
http://www.unpri.org/files/PRI%2OReport%20on%2OProgress%2009.pdf.
21 EFC, Towards Sustainable and Responsible Investment in Emerging Markets
(2003), available at http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Attachments
ByTitle/psri/$FILE/SRIIFC.pdf.
22 IFC, Sustainable Investing in Emerging Markets (2009), available at
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/p_SI-
EmergingMarkets/$FILE/Sustainable+Investing+in+Emerging+Marketspdf'
23 HELGA BIRGDEN, DANYELLE GuYATT & XINTING JIA, GAINING GROUND:
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investment process.24 Interestingly, the survey finds that global
asset managers with investment in emerging markets are more
likely to develop SRI policies than managers without such
investment in emerging markets.
International investors have recently increased their interest in
emerging securities markets. As of June 30, 2009, the Dow Jones
Sustainability World Index (DJSI World) included eighteen
emerging-market companies from Brazil, China, India, South
Africa, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. 25 Domini Social
Investment, one of the most prominent SRI investment companies,
launched the Domini PacAsia Social Equity Fund in December
2006, focusing on socially screened diversified mid- to large-cap
stocks in the Asia-Pacific region.26 On January 30, 2008, Standard
& Poor's, CRISIL and KLD Research & Analytics (an SRI
research firm), launched the S&P ESG India Index. The India
Index is the first index produced under the IFC's project on SRI
indices in emerging markets; similar indices in other emerging
markets will be established under the project in the near future.27
At the individual country level, for example, the Johannesburg
Securities Exchange (JSE) in South Africa launched the Socially
Responsible Investment Index (SRI Index) in May 2004 "in
response to the burgeoning debate around sustainability globally
24 See id.
25 See Dow Jones Sustainability Index World Components (2009)
http://www.sustainability-
index.com/djsi_protected/dsji-world/components/SAM DJSIWorld_Components.pdf.
26 See Anne Moore Odell, New Domini Funds Invest in the World, SOCIALFUNDS
SUSTAINABILITY INVESTMENT NEWS, 3 Jan. 11, 2007,
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/2202.htnl. (According to Amy Domini, the
founder and CEO of Domini, "International investing represents a great opportunity, and
a significant challenge, for people who want their investments to make a difference on a
global scale. Europe is leading the world in corporate social responsibility and
sustainable business models, and we and our shareholders are excited about being a part
of that. Meanwhile, dramatic economic growth in Asia has often been accompanied by
pollution, deforestation, sweatshop labor, and human rights violations. This is a region
where conscious, responsible investing is needed, and can really make a difference."
Id.).
27 See Press Release, Int'l Fin. Group, Standard and Poor's ESG India Index
Launched: IFC-Backed Index Provides Avenue to Invest in Leaders in Envtl, Social and
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and particularly in the South African context., 28 The criteria of
JSE's SRI Index are structured along the ESG (Environment,
Society, and Governance) approach promoted by the UN PRI.29
The environmental criteria are aligned with the FTSE4Good
environmental standards, while social and governance criteria are
managed in a thematic manner, "with specific emphasis on local
issues such as black economic empowerment, skills development
and HIV/AIDS." 3 °  According to the Experts in Responsible
Investment Solutions (EIRIS), a world-renowned organization in
the area of sustainability research, South Africa had twenty-one
SRI funds with US$1.6 billion under management in 2006. 31
More recently, a 2007 United Nations Environmental Program
Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) survey estimated that as much as
eleven percent of ZAR 2.3 trillion assets managed by asset
managers in South Africa were under some formal SRI strategies
(i.e., screening and shareholder activism).3" Moreover, a number
of institutional investors, including South Africa's largest pension
fund (GEPF) and a dozen other asset management companies,
have been active in committing themselves to the UN PRI.33
SRI is also developing quickly among institutional investors in
Brazil. Brazilian institutional investors have an active presence in
the UN PRI, including sixteen asset owners and four asset
management companies. The catalyst for the mainstreaming of
SRI may be the launch of the Corporate Sustainability Index (ISE)
28 JSE Ltd., Welcome to the JSE SRI Index 1, http://www.jse.co.za/sri/ (last
visited Oct. 25, 2009).
29 See JSE Ltd., JSE SRI Index, http://www.jse.co.za/sri/criteria.jsp (last visited
Oct. 25, 2009).
30 See, e.g., Press Release, JSE Ltd., The JSE's SRI Index Challenges Investors to
Invest Responsibly 5 (Nov. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.jse.co.za/sri/docs/2007/SRI%20Index%20Press%20Release.finat2.pdf.
31 David Tozer, Broadening Horizons For Responsible Investment: An Analysis of
50 Major Emerging Market Companies, September 2006,
http://www.eiris.org/files/research%20publications/emergingmarketseepO6.pdf.
32 See, e.g., UNEP FI, Innovative financing for sustainability, the State of
Responsible Investment in South Africa: A Survey of Approaches and Perceptions of the
South Africa Investment Community Environmental, Social and Governance Issues 49
(2007), http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/TheState-of Responsible
_Investment_0l.pdf.
33 See Principles for Responsible Investment, Signatories to the Principles of
Responsible Investment, http://www.unpri.org/signatories.
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in 2005 by Brazil's stock exchange (BOVESPA), with the
financial support from the IFC.34 "ISE is designed to measure the
return on a portfolio composed of shares of companies highly
committed to social responsibility and corporate sustainability, and
also promote good practices in the Brazilian corporate
environment."35
In Malaysia, two SRI funds were launched in 2003.36 The
Malaysian government also directed the two major pension funds
in Malaysia (the Employment Providence Fund and the Pension
Trust Fund) to "consider favorably PLC's (public listed
companies) with good CSR (corporate social responsibility)
practices" when making investment decisions.37 The motivation
for the policy is based on the belief that CSR activities are in line
with Malaysia's socio-economic objectives and can attract
domestic and foreign investors.38
The diffusion of SRI is also taking place in India and China,
two giant emerging markets. In India, the office of ABN AMRO
Asset Management Company launched India's first SRI fund
(ABN AMRO Sustainable Development Fund) in March 2007. 39
In China (excluding Hong Kong), the Bank of China launched the
Sustainable Growth Equity Fund in May 2006, and the Industrial
Management Company made the initial public offering of the
34 See Oliver Balch, Brazil and Socially Responsible Investment - Indexing
Responsible Companies, Ethical Corporation, Sept. 27, 2005,
http://www.ethicalcorp.com/content.asp?ContentlD=3906&ContTypelD=.
35 BM&F BOVESPA, Corporate Sustainability: ISE 5,
http://www.bovespa.com.br/indexi.asp (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
36 See ASrIA: SRI Funds Portal, Malaysia,
http://www.asria.org/portal/SRI Fund/Malaysia (last visited Oct. 25, 2009). The two
SRI funds are Mayban Ethical Trust Fund and Phillip First Ethical Fund. Id. The SRI
funds here exclude Shariah funds, which are investment funds managed in conformity
with the precepts of the Islamic Shariah. See ASrIA SRI Funds Portal, SRI Funds
Summary, http://www.asria.org/portalVSRIFund/srifund (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
37 Yab Dato' Seri Abdullah bin Hj. Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister and Minister of
Finance of Malaysia, The 2007 Budget Speech: Introducing the Supply Bill in the
Dewan Rakyat 22 (Sept. 1, 2006) (transcript available at
http://www.epu.gov.my/c/document library/get file?uuid=06cda8al -b 182-419d-ba57-
891c4ea7958b&groupld=10131).
38 Id.
39 See Anne Moore Odell, ABN AMRO Asset Management Launches First Indian
SRI Mutual Fund, Socialfunds-Sustainability Investment News Mar. 22, 2007,
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/2255.html.
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Xingye SRI Fund in March 2008, which opened China's domestic
SRI market.4° Moreover, China's first SRI index was launched at
the beginning of 2008 by the Shenzhen Securities Information
Company and Tianjin Teda Company. The "TEDA
Environmental Protection Index" focuses on the top forty
environmentally responsible companies listed on the two major
Chinese stock exchanges (i.e., Shanghai Stock Exchange and
Shenzhen Stock Exchange). In August 2009, the Shanghai Stock
Exchange also launched the "Responsibility Index," selecting the
top 100 companies on the stock exchange which have the best
value of "social contribution per share." 4
SRI is also growing in other Asian emerging markets including
South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand, among which South Korea has
the greatest development, with thirty-seven SRI mutual funds4
and six SRI pension funds.43
Additionally, international development organizations have
recently incorporated SRI into their development projects in
emerging markets. For example, the UNEP FI launched the
Emerging Market Responsibility Investment Project in November
2004 with the purpose of "increas[ing] awareness amongst
investors globally of the relevance of responsible investment in
emerging markets" and "creat[ing] international and domestic
framework conditions that enable stable capital markets
integrating social, environmental and corporate governance
concerns." " Moreover, the IFC launched the Social
40 See Bill Baue, Bank of China International Investment Managers Launches First
SRI Fund in China, Socialfunds - Sustainability Investment News 1, Jun. 6, 2006,
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/2026.html; see also Aegon-Industrial Fund
Management Co. Ltd., Industrial Social Responsibility,
http://www.xyfimds.com. cn/column.do?mode=searchtopic&english= I channelid=62&cat
egoryid=1377 (containing information about Xingye Social Responsibility Fund,
including prospectuses).
41 See Shanghai Stock Exchange,
http'/www.sse.com.cn/ps/zhs/sjs/hotspothotspot2009805a.html;
http://www.sse.com.cn/ps/zhs/sjs/hotspot/hotspot20090721a.html. For details about the
idea of "social contribution per share", see infra note 91 and related text.
42 See Korea, Ass'n for Sustainable & Responsible Inv. in Asia,
httpJ/www.asria.org/portal/SRIFund/Korea (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
43 See Pension Mandates, Ass'n for Sustainable & Responsible Inv. in Asia,
http'//www.asria.org/portal/SRJ_Fund/Pensionmandates (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
44 See United Nations Environmental Programme Finance Initiative,
http://www.unepfi.org/work_streams/investment/emergingmarkets/index.html (last
2009]
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Responsibility Program to help corporations in emerging markets
manage social and environmental risks related to their business
operations. 4" In October 2007, the IFC and thirty development
finance institutions around the world signed the Approach
Statement on Corporate Governance, "under which each
institution agrees to help raise corporate governance to the level of
environmental and social considerations in their due diligence and
financing of private and public companies in emerging markets."46
Overall, although SRI is now growing in many emerging
markets, it nevertheless remains rare and immature. As the IFC
reports consistently find, domestic investors in emerging markets
have low awareness of SRI and therefore low demand for it, while
international SRI investors are discouraged from investing in
emerging markets due to lack of CSE information about
companies in emerging markets.47 If international SRI investors
can increase their presence in emerging markets, then they may
diffuse the SRI practices more quickly to domestic investors in
emerging markets so as to create internal demand for SRI in the
markets. But if CSE information is unavailable, the diffusion
process will be slow. A very recent survey by EIRIS, a leading
global research organization on SRI, also finds that the biggest
obstacle to SRI in emerging markets is the lack of CSE
information.48 The availability of CSE information therefore is
very critical for SRI development.
III. The Current Condition of CSE Disclosure Practices in
Emerging Securities Markets
Disclosure is generally regarded as essential for the operation
of a securities market. Insufficient or inaccurate information may
visited Oct. 25, 2009).
45 See IFC, http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/Social
Responsibility (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
46 IFC, DFIs Corporate Governance Initiative, http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/
economics.nsf/Content/CGDFIsInitiative (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
47 See supra notes 21 & 22; see also IFC, UNDISCLOSED RISK: Corporate
Environmental and Social Reporting in Emerging Asia (June 2009),
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/PublicationsSustFinance.
48 See EIRJS, Emerging Markets Investor Survey Report: An Analysis of
Responsible Investment in Emerging Markets (June 2009),
http://www.eiris.org/files/research%20publications/emdpinvestorsurveyjune09.pdf.
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lead investors to misjudge their investment decisions and may
hamper the allocative efficiency of investment capital and other
scarce resources. Given the importance of disclosure, all major
securities markets have extensive regulations regarding what
information to disclose and how to disclose it to investors. There
are various kinds of disclosure obligations for public companies in
securities markets. The most familiar type for investors is the
annual report issued by public companies. In the United States,
for example, the annual report contains a wide range of required
information to ensure that shareholders make informed decisions
when exercising their voting rights in director elections. These
requirements include a general description about the company's
business and the company's property; material legal proceedings;
financial statements; management's discussion and analysis of
financial condition and results of operations; the attestation and
assessment of internal control over financial reporting; the
background information about directors and officers; codes of
ethics; the executive compensation; and the structure of corporate
governance.49 As shown below, the annual report is a key medium
through which a growing number of companies disclose social and
environmental information to investors. In addition to integrating
CSE information into annual reports, companies may also disclose
CSE information through separate reports, generally called
corporate social responsibility reports (CSR reports) or
sustainability reports.
A wealth of evidence suggests that CSE disclosure has become
a common practice for large companies in developed markets. "
For example, according to the KPMG International Survey of
Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2008, 83% (or 207
companies) of the Global Fortune 250 published SRI in a separate
report or as part of the annual report.51 At the national level, 93%
of the top 100 companies in Japan, 91% in the UK, 74% in the
United States, and 62% in Canada, have published either stand-
alone or integrated CSR reports.5 2
49 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1998).
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Compared to that of developed markets, CSE disclosure
generally remains a relatively rare practice in emerging markets. "
Nevertheless, recent evidence suggests that CSE disclosure is now
burgeoning in some emerging securities markets. According to
the KPMG 2008 survey, 60% of Brazil's top 100 companies
published CSE information in a separate report or the annual
report for the year between mid-2007 and mid-2008; compared
with 17% of Mexico's top 100 companies; 42% of South Korea's;
42% of South Africa's; 26% of Hungary's; 23% of Romania's;
and 14% of the Czech Republic's.
5 4
Although CSE disclosure is growing in some emerging
securities markets, empirical studies generally find that the quality
of such CSE disclosure suffers the following problems: A very
limited amount of information; lack of comparability over years
and between companies; unbalanced disclosure, with a greater
emphasis on good rather than bad news; and a lack of third-party
auditing to assure information credibility. " In fact, developed
companies have the same problems as well, though less severe. 5
6
In order to improve the quality and quantity of CSE disclosure,
many developed markets such as France, Denmark, Norway and
the UK have required public companies to disclose CSE
information in their annual reports.57 As shown in the following




55 See, e.g., Karen Paul et al., Corporate Social Reporting in Mexico, 22 J. CORP.
CITIZENSHIP 67 (Summer 2006); Paul Thompson & Zarina Zakaria, Corporate Social
Responsibility Reporting in Malaysia, 13 J. CORP. CITIZENSMP 125 (Spring 2004); Tianxi
Zhang et al., Corporate Environmental Reporting on the Web: An Exploratory Study of
Chinese Listed Companies, 1 ISSUES IN SOCIAL & ENVTL. ACCNT. 91 (2007); Ataur
Rahman Belal, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES (2008) (focusing on CSE disclosure in Bangladesh).
56 See, e.g., supra note 50 (finding that developed markets generally have better
CSE disclosure in terms of information quantity and quality but CSE disclosure in
developed markets remain problematic). In a series of reports on the condition of CSE
disclosure globally, CorporateRegister.com, a leading global directory of CSR resources,
also finds better CSE disclosure in developed markets but that still face the problems.
Available at http//www.corporateregister.com/downloads/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
57 See supra notes 8-11.
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IV. The Regulatory Development of CSE Disclosure in
Emerging Securities Markets
Currently CSE disclosure is voluntary in most emerging
markets, either because there are only voluntary guidelines or no
regulations at all. Yet, in recent years, securities regulators
(securities regulatory agencies and stock exchanges) in some
emerging markets have adopted explicit CSE disclosure
requirements. These markets include South Africa, Malaysia,
China, Taiwan, and Thailand. This section will examine the
regulatory development of CSE disclosure in these markets and
compare their different regulatory patterns.
A. South Africa
The most researched case so far may be that of South Africa.
In 2002, the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa published a
revised version of the King Report on Corporate Governance for
South Africa (the "King Code").58 The King Code is an advisory
code, which recommends the best practices of corporate
governance for South African companies. The King Code
includes a detailed section of Integrated Sustainability Reporting,
in which "every company should report at least annually on the
nature and extent of its social, transformation, ethical, safety,
health and environmental management policies and practices."'5 9
Under the King Code, the board of directors should disclose CSE
information based on "the principles of reliability, relevance,
clarity, comparability, timeliness and verifiability with reference
to the Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability Reporting
Guidelines on economic, environmental and social
performance."6 It further suggests at length that the board of
directors should give specific consideration to a wide range of
information. The information in short includes: objectives and
58 The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa is a membership institute with the
purpose of improving corporate governance and with a historical connection with the
Institute of Directors in the UK.
59 See King Committee on Corporate Governance, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE
KING REPORT 2002, Item 5.1.1 (2002).
60 See id. at Item 5.1.3.; see also GRI homepage,
http://www.globalreporting.org/Home (The Global Reporting Initiative Sustainability
Reporting Guidelines (GRI Reporting Guidelines) are the global leading standards of
CSE disclosure. The GRI is a large multi-stakeholder network at the global level).
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practices concerning workplace safety and occupational health;
policies concerning the potential impact of HIV/AIDS on the
company's operation; environmental governance that reflects the
cost-and-benefit standard set forth in South African law; policies
endorsing black economic empowerment; and other detailed issues
concerning human capital development. 6
The King Code itself is advisory in nature, but by virtue of the
Listing Requirements of the Johannesburg Securities Exchange
(JSE), all the public companies listed on the stock exchange must
comply with the King Code or justify any noncompliance. 62
Under the JSE Listing Requirements, a listed company is required
to make "a narrative statement of how it has applied the principles
set out in the King Code" and "a statement addressing the extent
of the company's compliance with the King Code and the reasons
for noncompliance with any of the principles in the King Code."63
This combination of the advisory King Code and the Listing
Requirements in South Africa constitutes an adoption of the
"comply or explain" approach, originating from the U.K.
Combined Code on Corporate Governance. 4 The comply or
explain approach is a "two-tier order of compliance."65 The first
tier is voluntary compliance with the substantive standards in the
Code, such as whether to engage in CSE disclosure.66 The second
tier is mandatory disclosure of whether the corporation complies
with the substantive standards in the Code, and the corporation's
justification for any deviations.6" In other words, a company may
choose whether to make substantive CSE disclosure, but if the
company chooses not to, it must give an explanation for the
noncompliance.
A series of studies conducted by KPMG suggests that the
61 For detailed information, see supra note 59, at Item 5.1.4.
62 See Johannesburg Securities Exchange, Ltd., JSE Limited Listing Requirements
§ 8.63 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.jse.co.zallr_listingrequirements.jsp (follow
"Section 8 - Financial Information" hyperlink).
63 Id.
64 See Bj6m Fasterling, Prospects and Limits of Corporate Governance Codes,
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY 467, 469 (Paul
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listed companies in South Africa have improved CSE disclosure in
recent years, partly due to the JSE's adoption of the comply or
explain approach.68 But this improvement should be regarded with
caution. As another study found, the majority of listed companies
in South Africa still disclose information in an "aspirational,
anecdotal and episodic manner, with an emphasis on positive
content."69 Further, the study suggested that "the relative lack of
regulatory enforcement may be one of the reasons why the
majority of South African companies do not commit themselves to
objective targets or report their performance against such
targets."7 A lack of investor pressure may be another contributing
factor.7' If regulatory and market enforcement are conditions for
the effectiveness of the comply or explain approach, existing
research casts uncertainty as to whether the comply or explain
approach works in South Africa for the present and near future.72
B. Malaysia
In 2006, the Malaysian stock exchange (Bursa Malaysia)
amended its listing rules to require listed companies to include in
their annual reports "[a] description of the corporate social
responsibility activities or practices undertaken by the listed issuer
and its subsidiaries or if there are none, a statement to that
effect."73 As Bursa Malaysia makes clear, "[t]he practice of CSR
68 See KPMG, 2006 SURVEY OF INTEGRATED SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING IN
SOUTH AFRICA (KPMG Services (Proprietary) Ltd. 2006), available at
http://www.kpmg.co.za/images/naledi/pd'/o20documents/mcl 672%20sustainability%20
survey/o2036pg.pdf (discussing the significance of the adoption of the "comply or
explain" approach and finding that thirty-six percent of the 141 companies listed on the
JSE indicated the use of the GRI Guidelines in their annual reports or stand-alone
reports); Wayne Visser, Corporate Citizenship in South Africa, J. CORP. CITIZENSHIP
29, 34-35 (Summer 2005) (tabulating the results of the KPMG 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002, and 2003 surveys on South Africa with respect to the emergence of corporate
sustainability reporting).
69 Dan Sonnenberg & Ralph Hamann, The JSE Socially Responsible Investment
Index and the State of Sustainability Reporting in South Africa, 23 DEV. S. AFR. 305,
311 (2006).
70 Id.
71 See id. at 317 ("Considering South African investors' relative lack of interest in
sustainability issues . . . some corporate managers are asking themselves whether
sustainability reporting is worth the considerable effort").
72 See id. at 310-20.
73 Bursa Malaysia, Main Market Listing Requirements ch. 9 app. 9C-5 pt. A 29
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activities is completely voluntary and at the discretion of listed
issuers," and "[t]he requirement for disclosure of CSR activities is
for enhanced transparency and to encourage listed issuers to bear
in mind CSR when undertaking their business and operations."'74
In essence, Malaysia's approach shares the philosophy of South
Africa's comply or explain approach, but Bursa Malaysia neither
prescribes the contents of disclosure in relation to CSR activities
nor gives clear guidance on what and how to report.75 In the 2008
Budget Speech delivered by Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah
Ahmad Badawi, the government restated its policy launched in the
previous year, requiring all publicly listed companies to disclose
CSR activities in the annual report, and further ordered all publicly
listed companies to disclose "employment composition by race
and gender" as of the 2008 financial year.76 It is unclear how the
Malaysian government will implement the CSE disclosure
requirement, but there is no question that CSE disclosure has
attracted political attention in Malaysia.
C. China
The two stock exchanges in the Chinese securities market, the
Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges, recently took action to
promote CSE disclosure.
In September 2006, the Shenzhen Stock Exchange released the
Guide on Listed Companies' Social Responsibility [hereinafter
(Aug. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.klse.com.my/website/bm/reguation/rules/listing-requirements/downloads/b
m_ mainchapter9.pdf; see also Bursa Malaysia, Amendments on Various Enhancements
to the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad,
SRiTHY/YYT(LACLA)/LD21/06 3(h) (Dec. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.klse.com.my/website/bm/regulation/rules/listing-requirements/downloads/L
RMBSB variousenhancements_150107.pdf.
74 Bursa Malaysia, Questions and Answers Relating to Amendments on Various
Enhancements to the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia Securities Berhad for the
Main Board, Second Board ("LR") and the MESDAQ Market ("MMLR") 3.13 (Dec.
14, 2006), available at http://www.klse.com.my/website/bm/regulation/rules/
listingrequirements/downloads/faq20070115_variousenhancements.pdf.
75 See id. at 3.14-.15 (stating that no "specific requirements" have been
prescribed with respect to how the CSR statement should be incorporated into the annual
report or what it must include).
76 Yab Dato' Seri Abdullah bin Hj. Ahmad Badawi, Prime Minister and Minister of
Finance of Malaysia, The 2008 Budget Speech (Sept. 7, 2007) (full text on file with
author).
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"Shenzhen Guide"].77 Article 36 of the Shenzhen guide states that
"[c]ompanies may release their social responsibility reports along
with their annual reports."78 It also suggests that this report should
contain at least the following information: "(1) [I]mplementation
of social responsibility relating to employee protection, impact on
environment, product quality and community relationship; (2)
assessment of implementation of these Instructions and reasons for
the gap, if any; and (3) measures for improvement and the
timetable."79 A recent Chinese study analyzed the effect of the
Shenzhen Guide on CSE disclosure practices by listed companies
on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.8" The study suggested that the
Shenzhen Guide plays an important role in promoting CSE
disclosure by the listed companies. 8 Furthermore, the study found
that no listed companies on the stock exchange had issued separate
CSR reports before the release of the Shenzhen Guide, but that by
the end of April 30, 2007, the fiscal year following the release of
the Shenzhen Guide, twenty listed companies on the stock
exchange had published separate CSR reports along with their
2006 annual reports, ten of which clearly mentioned the Shenzhen
Guide as a reference.
82
Compared to the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, the Shanghai
Stock Exchange appears more ambitious in cultivating CSE
disclosure. In May 2008, the Shanghai Stock Exchange
promulgated the "Guide on Environmental Information Disclosure
for Companies Listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange"
[hereinafter "Shanghai Guide"] and "Notice on Strengthening
Social Responsibility of Listed Companies" [hereinafter
"Shanghai Notice"]. 83 Under the scheme provided in the Shanghai
77 Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange Social Responsibility
Instructions to Listed Companies (Sept. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.szse.cn/main/en/rulseandregulations/sserules/2007060410636.shtml.
78 Id. at art. 36.
79 Id.
80 Zheng Chen, Shangshi Gongsi 2006 nian Shehui Zeren Baogao Jiedu
yu Wanshan Jianyi [An Analysis of Listed Companies' 2006 CSR Reports and
Some Suggestions for Improvement], 8 SEC. MARKET HERALD_28 (2007) (P.RC.).
81 See id.
82 See id.
83 See SSE Drives Listed Companies to Fulfill Social Responsibilities, SHANGHAI
SEC. NEWS, May 14, 2008, available at http://static.sse.com.cn/enus/cs/about/
news/en news 20080514a.html.
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Guide and the Shanghai Notice, there are three kinds of disclosure:
(1) Real-time disclosure of significant environmental events; (2)
special disclosure by blacklisted companies; and (3) CSR annual
reports.84 The former two have underpinnings in environmental
regulation and, therefore, are mandatory in nature.85
Real-time disclosure of significant environmental events
requires a listed company to disclose possible impact on its
operation and stakeholders within two days of the occurrence of
any of the following events: Significant investments in projects
that have material environmental impact; significant investigations
or punishments by the government because of environmental law
violations; material litigations concerning environmental
problems; blacklisting by environmental agencies; announcement
of a new environmental law or regulation that may have material
impact on corporate operation; and any other events that may have
significant impact on stock prices. 86 Special disclosure by
blacklisted companies means that companies blacklisted by
environmental agencies must, within two days of the
announcement of the blacklist, disclose information including the
type, density; and quantity of pollutants, conditions of
environmental protection facilities; environmental emergency
plans; and preventive measures concerning emission reduction.87
As for CSR reporting, the Shanghai Guide encourages listed
companies to publish annual CSR reports along with their annual
84 See Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Shangshi Gongsi Huanjing Xinxi Pilu Zhiyin
[Guide on Environmental Information Disclosure for Companies Listed on the Shanghai
Stock Exchange, "Shanghai Guide"] arts. 1-9, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE, May 14,
2008 (P.R.C.), available at http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/flgz/rules/
sserules/sseruler20080514a.htm, (bottom frame) (last visited Oct. 25, 2009); Guanyu
Jiaqiang Shangshi Gongsi Shehui Zheren Chengdan Gongzuo de Tongzhi [Notice on
Strengthening the Social Responsibility of Companies Listed on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange, "Shanghai Notice"] arts. 1-9, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE, May 14, 2008
(P.RC.), available at http://www.sse.com.cn/cs/zhs/xxfw/flgz/rules/sserules/
sseruier20080514a.htm (top frame) (last visited Oct. 25, 2009).
85 See, e.g., Environmentally Responsible Corporate Conduct in China, ORG. FOR
ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD) INVESTMENT POL. REV. - CHINA (2008), 257-
84, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/53/41792807.pdf (last visited Oct. 25,
2009).
86 See Guide on Environmental Information Disclosure for Companies Listed on
the Shanghai Stock Exchange, supra note 84 at art. 2.
87 See id.
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financial reports on the Shanghai Stock Exchange website.88 The
Shanghai Stock Exchange offers suggestions about what to
disclose, including the following information: Environmental
protection policies, annual goals, and performance; annual
consumption of resources and energy; environmental investment
and environmental technology development; the type, quantity,
density and location of pollutants; condition of environmental
protection facilities; waste recycling; voluntary agreements on
environmental improvement with environmental agencies; awards
granted by environmental agencies; and other environmental
information voluntarily disclosed. 89 The Shanghai Stock
Exchange also suggests that listed companies may disclose in their
annual CSR reports "social contribution per share," derived from
the idea of "earnings per share."9
In December 2008, the Shanghai Stock Exchange further
accelerated the development of CSE disclosure by requiring three
types of listed companies to issue the CSR annual report from the
2008 fiscal year.91 The three types include companies which are
listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange Corporate Governance
Index, companies that list shares overseas, and companies in the
finance sector. 92 According to information released by the
Shanghai Stock Exchange, there were 290 listed companies
88 See id. at art. 3.
89 See id.
90 The "Shanghai Notice" explains that the social contribution per share may be
equal to the sum of earnings plus taxes paid, employee salaries paid, interest paid to
banks, and donations, minus environmental pollution, and then divided by the number of
shares. See Shanghai Notice, supra note 84.
91 See, e.g., Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Guanyu Zuohao Shangshi Gongsi 2008
Nian Liixin Shehui Zheren de Baogao ji Neibu Kongzhi Ziwo Pinggu Baogao Polu
Gongzuo de Tongzhi [The Shanghai Stock Exchange's Notice Concerning Listed
Companies' Implementation of Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting and Internal
Control Self-Evaluation Reporting in 2008] arts. 1-17, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE,
Dec. 4, 2008 (P.RIC.), available at http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20081231/
01402602667.shtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2009); Shanghai Zhengquan Jiaoyisuo Guanyu
Zuohao Shangshi Gongsi 2008 Niandu Baogao Gongzuo de Tongzhi [The Shanghai
Stock Exchange's Notice Concerning Listed Companies' Preparation for their 2008
Annual Reports] arts. 1-21, SHANGHAI STOCK EXCHANGE, Dec. 31, 2008 (P.R.C.),
available at http://www.sse.com.cn/ps/zhs/sjs/hotspot/hotspot20081231a.html (last
visited Oct. 25, 2009).
92 See, e.g., The Shanghai Stock Exchange's Notice Concerning Listed Companies'
Preparation for their 2008 Annual Reports, supra note 91, at art. 10.
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publishing CSR reports for the fiscal year of 2008. 9" Of these 290
companies, 258 companies issued CRS reports because of the
mandatory requirement, while only 32 issued reports voluntarily. 94
The Securities and Regulatory Commission in Fujian Province
also took regulatory measures to promote CSE disclosure. The
commission issued a regulatory instruction requiring listed
companies incorporated in Fujian to publish annual CSR reports
along with their annual reports starting with the fiscal year of
2007. 9' Because of the regulatory instruction, by the end of April
30, 2008, all thirty-six listed companies incorporated in the Fujian
jurisdiction had published CSR reports; thirty-one published
stand-alone CSR reports; while the remaining five included a CSR
section in their 2007 annual reports. 96 Meanwhile, twenty-five of
the companies' boards of directors decided to institutionalize CSR
activities and periodically publish CSR reports.97
D. Taiwan
In December 2008, the Taiwan Financial Supervisory
Commission (FSC), the agency responsible for regulating the
financial market in Taiwan, amended the disclosure rules
regarding public companies' annual reports. According to the
amended rules, a public company in Taiwan is required to include
in its annual report information on "systems and measures that the
company has adopted with respect to environmental protection,
93 Special Topic: Seminar of Social Responsibility of Listed Companies (Held by




95 See Fujian CSRC, Guanyu 2007 Nian Niandu Baogao Xiangguan
Gongzuo de Buchong Tongzhi [A Complementary Notice Concerning the 2007
Annual Report], available at http://www.csrc.gov.cn/n575458/n870603/
n1335084/103791 1l.htrnl, (P.R.C.).
96 See Miao Kang, Fujian Zhengjianju: Xiaqu Shangshi Gongsi Bianzhi
Nianbao Shi Bixu Jiaru Shehui Zeren [CSRC: Corporations Incorporated in
Fujian Jurisdiction should Include CSR Information When Preparing for the Annual
Report], XIHUA, Jan. 18, 2008, available at
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2008-01/18/content_7445136.htm (reporting the
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community participation, contribution to society, service to society,
social and public interests, consumer rights and interests, human
rights, safety and health, and other corporate social responsibilities
and activities."98 As of this Article's date of publication, the
regulations have not yet given details on how to disclose such
information.
E. Thailand
In 2006, the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) promulgated a
revised version of the Principles of Good Corporate Governance
for Listed Companies.99 The new Principles suggest that "[t]he
board of directors should set clear policies on environmental and
social issues" and the company should disclose the environmental
and social policies as well as the implementation condition of the
policies."' The SET adopts a comply or explain approach with
regard to the implementation of the new Principles. 1 ' Companies
have discretion in deciding whether to comply with the substantive
requirements but must give justifications for noncompliance. 102
The SET requested that companies disclose the implementation
condition of the new Principles in their annual reports, beginning
in 2007.'0'
F. Summary
The five emerging markets use regulatory measures to promote
CSE disclosure and demonstrate different regulatory patterns.
As with the regulator, stock exchanges seem more active in
promoting CSE disclosure. Securities regulatory agencies and
stock exchanges are the two major regulators in securities markets.
The five case studies suggest that stock exchanges tend to play a
greater role in regulating CSE disclosure than securities regulatory
98 Regulations Governing Information to be Published in Annual Reports of Public
Companies, Recently Modified Articles, art. 10, available at
http://db.lawbank.com.tw/eng/FLAW/FLAWDATI0.asp?lsid=FLOO7032 (last visited
Oct. 25, 2009).
99 See CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CTR., THE STOCK EXCHANGE OF THAILAND, THE
PRINCIPLES OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR LISTED COMPANIES (2006).
100 See id. at ii, 3-4.
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agencies. The CSE disclosure regulations in South Africa,
Malaysia, China and Thailand are primarily developed by the
stock exchanges, while the CSE disclosure regulations in Taiwan
are developed by the securities regulatory agency. There may be
two reasons to explain why stock exchanges seem more likely to
take the lead in regulating CSE disclosure: First, stock exchanges
are more sensitive to international competitive dynamics,"° and
second, companies listed on the stock exchanges are usually larger
than non-listed companies in the domestic markets and therefore
have greater social and environmental impact as well as more
resources to engage in socially responsible corporate conduct.
As to the regulatory approach, South Africa and Thailand both
take a comply or explain approach embedded in the entire
corporate governance scheme. Malaysia also adopts an approach
that partly reflects the concept of comply or explain. Both China
and Taiwan adopt traditional mandatory disclosure in securities
regulation, requiring the disclosure of information concerning
certain topics.
As to the disclosure items in the regulation, the emerging
markets tailor CSE disclosure items to their local needs and
exhibit innovations in improving reporting quality. In South
Africa, the disclosure regulations pay particular attention to the
impact of HIV/AIDS on corporate activities and the
implementation of black economic empowerment policies that
redress the inequalities resulting from Apartheid. In Malaysia, the
disclosure regulations give priority to race and gender issues due
to the perennial shadow of ethnic tensions and the cultural
tradition in connection with discrimination against women. In
China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange created the concept of
"social contribution per share" to measure corporate social and
environmental performance.
As to the specificity of the regulation, South Africa has the
most detailed disclosure standards for listed companies, requiring
reference to the leading global standards of CSE disclosure, i.e.,
GRI. China also has some specific disclosure standards as a
reference for listed companies. Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand,
however, do not give much specificity concerning what to
104 See Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv. 1453, 1457-
58, 1479 (1997).
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disclose.
V. Challenges of CSE Disclosure Regulation in Emerging
Securities Markets
As shown in the previous section, different emerging markets
adopt different regulatory policies. At present, there are three CSE
disclosure approaches in securities regulation: voluntary disclosure,
mandatory disclosure, and comply or explain. Each approach has
its strengths and weaknesses in advancing CSE disclosure, and the
suitability of each approach in a country is complicated by the
institutional environment in the country. This section analyzes the
general strengths and weaknesses of each CSE disclosure
approach in emerging securities markets. Policymakers may find
such analysis helpful when considering CSE disclosure policies.
A. Voluntary Disclosure
CSE disclosure remains voluntary for most emerging securities
markets. The effectiveness of voluntary disclosure relies on
market power." 5 Voluntary disclosure posits that if investors truly
need information about a company's social and environmental
performance, the company will have an incentive to provide such
information. 106 Currently the awareness in emerging markets
remains low, and may be interpreted as low demand from
investors. Investors are assumed to know their own interests the
best. If investors do not demand CSE information, there is no
need to incur the great costs of legal compliance. Companies
which are particularly interested in catering to SRI investors can
voluntarily disclose relevant information. From this view,
voluntary disclosure seems a proper regulatory policy for
emerging markets. However, do investors in emerging markets
really know their own interests the best? Investors in emerging
markets usually have little knowledge of the functioning of
securities markets, and do not know how to protect themselves. 107
The low demand is very likely the result of ignorance rather than
calculated omission. Of course, the low demand of CSE
105 Celia R. Taylor, Capital Market Development in the Emerging Markets: Time to
Teach an Old Dog Some New Tricks, 45 AM. J. COMp. L. 71, 75 (1997).
106 Id.
107 See id. at 78.
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information by investors in emerging markets does not imply the
necessity of mandatory disclosure. However, it may suggest that
governments should do something to elicit the demand, such as
facilitating reporting through voluntary guidelines, partnering with
certain parties to support reporting, endorsing disclosure by
honoring transparent firms, and demonstrating transparency of
government as a positive example for companies. 108
For developed markets, voluntary disclosure might be regarded
as a deregulatory mechanism to improve market efficiency. For
emerging markets, voluntary disclosure might be deemed an
(involuntary) alternative to poor governmental regulation in those
markets. Voluntary disclosure can be viewed as a form of private
ordering-companies and investors can arrange disclosure items
and disclosure quality by themselves and without recourse to
formal legal institutions. For example, sophisticated institutional
investors may negotiate with companies to disclose information.
Information credibility may be obtained through private
arrangements, such as using sophisticated information
intermediaries including investment banks, securities analysts, and
auditing firms. Emerging securities markets seem able to thrive
on voluntary disclosure. However, the conditions of emerging
markets pose great challenges to voluntary disclosure as an
approach to advancing CSE disclosure.
First, emerging markets usually do not have experienced
institutional investors and qualified information intermediaries.
Private ordering takes time to develop. Information intermediaries
such as investment banks, securities analysts, auditing firms, and
rating agencies need time to build up their reputations. Although
it is generally recognized that emerging markets have weak legal
systems and that private ordering can be an effective substitute for
law, the substitute for securities law in emerging markets may not
be easily formed as one may assume for other kinds of commercial
transactions.0 9 Comparative law studies of emerging securities
108 See generally DARA O'ROURKE, THE WORLD BANK, OPPORTUNITIES AND
OBSTACLES FOR CORPORATE SOC. RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 31-32 (2004); TOM FOX ET AL., THE WORLD BANK, PUB. SECTOR ROLES IN
STRENGTHENING CORPORATE Soc. RESPONSIBILITY: A BASELINE STUDY, 3-6 (2002)
(arguing the mandating, facilitating, partnering, endorsing and demonstrating
approaches).
109 The current private ordering literature largely builds on interesting stories about
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markets have suggested that strong securities law is a crucial
element for the development of capital markets.1 ' A prominent
example is revealed in the comparative studies of the securities
markets in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. In creating
their securities markets, Hungary and Poland adopted relatively
strong securities regulations, especially with regard to disclosure
requirements, while the Czech Republic embarked on an
unregulated approach."' At that time, some suggested that the
Czech Republic would outperform because its strong regulation
would stifle the Hungarian and Polish markets, but the result was
to the contrary. 112  State regulation may be more important for
newly emerging markets than for mature markets; and "[a]s
markets evolve and market watchdog institutions, such as rating
agencies, emerge, the need for state regulation may decline."" 3
Second, private ordering in securities markets does not
develop without support from public ordering (law). For example,
legal liability is a more powerful determinant than market power
for information intermediaries to provide credible information. 114
This may imply that if information intermediaries (e.g., auditing
firms) face few legal risks (which is common in emerging
markets), the regulatory function of the private institutions would
how merchant communities enforce commercial contracts with extra-legal mechanisms,
not about securities trading in capital markets. See, e.g., John McMillan & Christopher
Woodruff, Dispute Prevention Without Courts in Vietnam, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 637,
640-41, 653 (1999); Barak D. Richman, How Community Institutions Create Economic
Advantages: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York, 31 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 383,
389, 393-408 (2006) (arguing that the combination of family-based reputation
mechanisms and community-based enforcement institutions allows the trading of
valuable and portable articles); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System:
Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 115
(1992); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724, 1724-28
(2001).
110 See Katharina Pistor, Law as a Determinant for Equity Market Development:
The Experience of Transition Economies, in ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAW IN
TRANSITION ECONOMIES 249, 249 (Peter Murrell ed., 2001).
I I Id. at 270-7 1.
112 Id. at 275-77.
113 Id. at 254.
114 See Inder K. Khurana & K.K Raman, Litigation Risk and the Financial
Reporting Credibility of Big 4 Versus Non-Big 4 Audits: Evidence from Anglo-American
Countries, 79 ACCT. REv. 473, 475 (2004).
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be significantly constrained.
In summary, voluntary disclosure is premised on the
functioning of private ordering and based on market efficiency.
However, most emerging markets do not have sophisticated
investors and information intermediaries. Private ordering takes
time to develop and even requires input from formal law. For
emerging securities markets, private ordering is an important
complement, but is not a substitute for securities law. CSE
disclosure might eventually thrive under voluntary disclosure, but
legal rules indeed accelerate the growth.
B. Mandatory Disclosure
Mandatory disclosure means companies must disclose CSE
information under regulatory requirements. Governments may
directly mandate public companies to disclose CSE information
through legislation. Securities regulatory agencies, pursuant to
authority by law, may mandate CSE disclosure through
regulations. Stock exchanges, usually private bodies with quasi-
governmental authority, may require listed companies to disclose
CSE information through listing rules.
The legal and economic conditions of emerging securities
markets pose two challenges to mandatory disclosure. One
concerns enforcement, and the other concerns the economic
effects on small- and medium-sized companies.
The existence of a legal mandate does not warrant compliance;
enforcement mechanisms are required. Securities laws or
regulations issued by governments have private and public
enforcement, both of which use legal institutions-the judiciary or
regulatory agencies. However, given that the legal institutions are
usually weak in many emerging securities markets, it is difficult to
make mandatory disclosure effective. Further, if regulatory
agencies and courts are incapable of enforcing law, does that leave
mandatory disclosure pointless? The answer may vary with the
different institutional environments in different emerging markets.
As discussed in Section IV, empirical evidence in China suggests
that mandatory disclosure can still effectively press companies to
disclose some information when the regulator is actually attentive
to this matter.
While stock exchanges are responsible for enforcing their
listing rules, many economic interests in the real operation of
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stock exchanges may undermine the effectiveness of such
enforcement. For example, a stock exchange is generally
unwilling to punish companies because that would tarnish the
exchange's public image and make the exchange less attractive for
other companies and investors." 5 As discussed in Section IV,
current CSE disclosure regulations in emerging markets are
usually issued by stock exchanges. The problems of stock
exchanges' willingness and ability to enforce their rules may raise
concerns over the effectiveness of CSE disclosure in listing rules.
Another challenge to mandatory disclosure comes from the
economic conditions of emerging securities markets. Studies
suggest that the degree of corporate social responsibility and
transparency is correlated with firm size." 6 Large companies tend
to have better performance than small and medium ones partly
because of their higher visibility and implementation capability. "7
Additionally, publicly traded companies in emerging markets are
usually relatively small compared to those in developed
markets."8 CSE disclosure may be a challenging task especially
when the disclosure obligations are very specific. For example,
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the leading international
CSE disclosure standards, requires sophisticated reporting
115 See Marcel Kahan, Some Problems With Stock Exchange-Based Securities
Regulation, 83 VA. L. Ruv. 1509, 1510-18 (1997) (analyzing the factors that make stock
exchanges unwilling to punish listed companies, including the brokerage commission
arrangements, the listing decision controlled by corporate managers, the oligopoly
market for stock listings, and public image concerns).
116 For the correlation between firm size and CSR performance, see, e.g.,
Peter A. Stanwick & Sarah D. Stanwick, The Relationship between Corporate Social
Performance, and Organizational Size, Financial Perjormance, and Environmental
Performance: An Empirical Examination, 17 J. Bus. ETHICS 195, 196 (1998); Khaled
Elsayed, Reexamining the Expected Effect ofAvailable Resources and Firm Size on Firm
Environmental Orientation: An Empirical Study of UK Firms, 65 J. Bus. ETHICS 297,
299 (2006). For studies concerning the correlation between firm size and CSE
disclosure, see, e.g., Ahmed Belkaoui & Philip G. Karpik, Determinants of the
Corporate Decision to Disclose Social Information, 2 ACCT., AUDITING &
ACCOUNTABILITY 36, 40 (1989); Dennis M. Patten, Exposure, Legitimacy, and Social
Disclosure, 10 J. ACCT. & Pun. POL'Y 297, 305 (1991); Scott S. Cowen et al., The
Impact of Corporate Characteristics on Social Responsibility Disclosure: A Typology
and Frequency-Based Analysis, 12 AccT. ORG. & SOC'Y 111, 113, 121 (1987).
117 See Stanwick & Stanwick, supra note 116, at 196, 198; Elsayed, supra note 116,
at 299.
118 See STANDARD & POOR's, GLOBAL STOCK MARKETS FACTBOOK 31 tbl. Top 25
Markets by Average Company Size in 2006 (2007).
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processes and systems to ensure the accurate and regular flow of
information, which may be a great burden for small and medium
sized companies." 9 In this regard, mandatory disclosure may pose
an entry barrier to financing through securities markets
particularly for small- and medium-sized companies in emerging
markets. The economic implications may suggest that
policymakers should provide specially tailored technical support
for small- and medium-sized companies.
A final note about mandatory disclosure is that its
effectiveness may be undermined if the disclosure requirements
and standards are unspecific. When adopting mandatory
disclosure, policymakers should set out specific rather than vague
requirements. There may be no great difference between
voluntary and mandatory disclosure if disclosure requirements are
vague. Moreover, given that companies in emerging markets are
unfamiliar with CSE disclosure, specific requirements may give
companies directions of how and what to disclose. As shown in
Section IV, currently the CSE disclosure regulations in emerging
markets usually lack disclosure details and therefore may not
effectively press companies to disclose meaningful information.
C. "Comply or Explain"
The "comply or explain" approach combines market power
with mandatory disclosure. Under the comply or explain
approach, a company may decide whether to disclose CSE
information; but if the company decides not to disclose, the
company is obligated to make a statement explaining the
nondisclosure. 120
The comply or explain approach is "based on the assumption
that the market will monitor compliance" and "will either (a)
penali[z]e noncompliance through lowering share prices" or other
mechanisms such as litigation, or (b) "accept . that
119 See William Baue & Graham Sinclair, Johannesburg Securities Exchange
Requires Compliance with King 11 and Global Reporting Initiative, SUSTAINABILITY
INVESTMENT NEWS, SOCIAL FUNDS, July 16, 2003,
http://www.socialfunds.com/news/article.cgi/1174.html (reporting the same concern
expressed by a senior SRI analyst).
120 lain MacNeil & Xiao Li, "Comply or Explain": Market Discipline and Non-
Compliance with the Combined Code, 14 CORP. GOVERNANCE 486, 486 (2006).
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noncompliance is justified in the circumstances."'' The comply
or explain approach is usually praised as an optimal approach in
developed markets because of its flexibility. But empirical
evidence in developed markets does not give much support to
markets actually reacting to the comply or explain condition. 122
The effectiveness of the comply or explain approach may be more
elusive given that the approach relies on both legal enforcement
and market pressure to some important degree, and emerging
markets usually have weaker market and legal underpinnings than
the developed markets.
Also, as highlighted in the Statement of the European
Corporate Governance Forum on the Comply-or-Explain
Principle, there are conditions for the comply or explain approach
to truly take effect. The conditions include (1) "a real obligation
to comply or explain;" (2) "a high level of transparency, with
coherent and focused disclosures;" and (3) "a way for shareholders
to hold company boards . . . ultimately accountable for their
decisions to comply-or-explain and the quality of their
disclosures."' 123 It is very likely that most emerging markets do not
meet those conditions. Policymakers in emerging markets should
carefully consider the capacity of legal and economic institutions
in local markets when adopting the comply or explain approach.
121 Id. at 487.
122 Bj6m Fasterling, Challenging "Comply or Explain," MAKING CAPITAL
MARKETS WORK THROUGH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 89, 92 (Madhav Mehra ed. 2008)
(arguing that empirical evidence in Germany and the Netherlands shows that markets do
not react to compliance or noncompliance; the evidence in UK and Spain does not give
much support as well); see generally MacNeil & Li, supra note 120 (questioning the
effectiveness of the flexibility provided though the comply and explain principle).
123 European Corporate Governance Forum, Statement of the European Corporate
Governance Forum on the Comply-or-Explain Principle (Feb. 22, 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/company/ecgforum/indexen.htm; See European
Corporate Governance Forum, European Corporate Governance Forum Minutes of the
Meeting of 21 November 2005 (Jan. 18, 2006), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal market/company/docs/ecgforum/minutes-21-11-05_en.pdf
(illustrating that the European Corporate Governance Commission was established in
October 2004 by the European Commission. The main purpose of this Forum is to
facilitate the information exchange between its member states and identify general
corporate governance problems); European Corporate Governance Forum, European
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The bottom line function of the comply or explain approach in
emerging markets may be that it is still better than having a
complete lack of measures in the initial stage of diffusing CSE
disclosure practices.
VI. Conclusion
CSE disclosure practices and regulations are growing in
emerging securities markets. This may signal that CSE disclosure
is not an advanced topic exclusive to developed markets but a
basic element in the initial stage of building a securities market.
Research on CSE disclosure in emerging markets is still in an
embryonic stage and requires further study. This Article examines
the CSE disclosure regulations in five emerging markets and
shows the different regulatory patterns in these markets. Future
research may examine more emerging markets and further explore
the factors that render these regulatory differences. Empirical
studies on the effects of CSE disclosure regulations in emerging
markets are also required. For policymakers in emerging markets,
the most cost-saving means of constructing their CSE disclosure
agenda would be to consult the experiences of developed markets
and copy their measures. However, there is a caveat: Institutional
environments in emerging markets are different from the
environments in developed markets. A CSE disclosure approach
that works in a developed market may not also work in an
emerging market. This point is particularly important given that
CSE disclosure is associated with legal and market maturity in a
securities market. Moreover, CSE disclosure in a securities
market is not an issue isolated in securities law, but embedded into
the whole legal system concerning corporate behavior, including
corporate law, labor and environmental law especially. Blindly
transplanting CSE disclosure measures from developed markets
into emerging markets without paying attention to institutional
differences would be ill-advised. This is not to say that the CSE
disclosure approach adopted by an emerging market would be
necessarily different from the approach by a developed market, but
the analysis of CSE disclosure in an emerging market should add
institutional factors, which may strengthen or weaken a given
approach if applied in an emerging market.
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